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SOME PROBLEMS WITH TAXPAYER-FUNDED
POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS
BRADLEY A. SMITHt
INTRODUCTION
If one were trying to identify the world's healthiest democracy, the
United States-with its long history of peaceful transitions of power,
independent judiciary, sound record in human rights, expansive per-
sonal liberties, low inflation and unemployment, balanced govern-
ment budgets, high standard of living, and relatively low taxes-would
seem as good a candidate as any. Despite this, for literally decades we
have been bombarded with complaints and warnings that this democ-
racy was fundamentally unhealthy due to its reliance on private funds
to finance political campaigns. Given the long-term record though, I
think it prudent to presume that we ought to retain our traditional,
private system of campaign finance, and that a high burden of proof
should be placed on those proposing radical change.
When all is said and done, the indictment of private financing of
campaigns rests on two arguments: it violates equality and fosters cor-
ruption. The system is unequal because not every citizen can give the
same amount and because not every candidate or party can raise the
same amount. They lack "equal" influence. It is "corrupt" because
officeholders might feel beholden either to those who gave them
money in the last election or to those who might give them money in
future elections. These officeholders will thus lose the ability to act
freely in carrying out their duties: they are subject to "undue influ-
ence."
For these reasons, twentieth-century America has witnessed a
steadily expanding set of rules and regulations aimed at controlling
the raising and spending of private campaign funds. But these efforts
to regulate the private system of campaign finance have failed to ac-
complish their objectives, in part due to mistaken assumptions about
the effects of money in politics, in part due to poorly designed legisla-
tion, and in part due to the role of the federal courts, which have
t Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. Thanks to Joel Gora for com-
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struck down many aspects of regulation on First Amendment grounds.
In short, regulating the private campaign finance system has, so far,
been a flop. Law has its limits.
Frustration with the failure of regulation to cure the alleged evils
of a private finance system have contributed to intellectual support for
financing all campaigns with tax dollars. Though this is usually called
.public" funding, that term is a misnomer. Campaigns are funded by
the public now-by hundreds of thousands, even millions of citizens
who make voluntary contributions to various candidates and organiza-
tions. What is euphemistically called "public" funding actually means
"government" funded campaigns, or "tax" funding of campaigns, and
I will address it as such. Government-funded campaigns are attractive
because they can potentially take monetary inequality out of the equa-
tion, and because, by eliminating the need for candidates to rely on
private donors, they can free officeholders to ignore the wishes of
these donors, presumably to act in accordance with the individual of-
ficeholder's own conception of the public good.
Part I of this Article addresses some of the difficult issues in de-
signing a system of government financing, in the process pointing out
some often overlooked advantages to a private finance system. Part II
reexamines the more fundamental justifications behind the push for
tax financing-the questions of equality and corruption. Part III
questions whether, even if all of these concerns are addressed, we will
actually accomplish anything by extending tax financing to congres-
sional and senatorial races.
I. EASIER SAID THAN DONE: SOME DIFFICULT ISSUES FOR
GOVERNMENT FINANCING
To say that one favors government financing of campaigns is a bit
like saying that one enjoys sports. Are we talking football? Kayaking?
Downhill skiing? Ballroom dancing? Chess? The options are endless.
Many people may favor government financing in principle, but op-
pose many, or even most, particular plans for government financing.
Say, for example, one proposed a government financing plan provid-
ing that incumbents would receive twenty times the amount of money
as challengers-I think it would have little support.1 Thus, let me be-
' One can argue that we already have a system of government financing that sub-
stantially favors incumbents, in the form of franking privileges, free web sites, paid
time off to campaign, and so on, so perhaps this suggestion is not so far fetched. See
Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 273, 289-91 (1993) (estimating the political self-subsidy of congressional
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gin not by criticizing government financing, but by considering a few
criteria by which any campaign finance system ought to be measured,
and compare how well government-financed plans generally fulfill
these criteria relative to private finance schemes.
Here are my proposed criteria?
Administrabiliy First, a system of campaign finance should be easy
to administer.
Flexibility Second, it should be flexible-able to adapt quickly to
changing political environments, new technologies, and evolving
campaign techniques.
Opportunity. Third, it should, if not necessarily foster more candi-
dacies and entries into politics by political newcomers, at least not
overly discourage such challenges.
Competitivees. Fourth, it should, if not necessarily promote more
competitive races, at least not overly insulate incumbents from chal-
lenge.
Communication: Finally, it should provide candidates with ade-
quate funds to communicate with and educate voters.
For now, I will leave off of the list what are arguably the two most
important criteria: the system should promote equality, and the sys-
tem should insulate legislators from the influence of money (the "cor-
ruption" thesis). These I will take up in Part II. Readers who consider
those to be the juicy questions in this debate can skip ahead. As for
the five goals listed above, I do not know that this is by any means an
exhaustive list, but it is certainly enough to get us started, and I think
incumbents to be $200,000 during a two-year period). At the same time, there must be
many people generally opposed to government financing who would, nonetheless,
support the right plan for government financing. I suspect that this group is much
smaller, however, because so much of the opposition to government financing is ideo-
logically based. There are many who have a blanket objection to any government fi-
nancing of campaigns as inherently beyond the scope of either good government, the
Constitution, or both.
2 These criteria, including equality and insulating legislators from the effect of
money, are inclusive of Professor Briffault's three criteria. See Richard Briffault, Public
Funding andDemocraticElectionS 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563, 563 (1999). ProfessorBriffault
elaborates on his criteria at some length and there is little in that portion of his discus-
sion with which I would disagree. My own take on the question of voter equality, be-
sides the discussion that follows, see infra Part II, is best explored in Bradley A. Smith,
Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 88-98
(1997). Because this Article is based on a resolution which I interpret as being more
focused on corruption, I have not addressed the equality issues here beyond describing
my general take of the dividing line between me and those with whom I disagree. My
disagreements with Professor Brifiault on the question of corruption are reasonably
well articulated in this Article.
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that most of these goals are relatively non-controversial. Although
there are potential advantages for government-financed systems in
meeting some of these criteria, in none of the five criteria listed above
is it at all clear that government-financed systems are preferable to
private ones.
A. Administrability
Campaign finance regulation creates compliance costs, both for
government and for private political actors. Many systems will require
substantial government resources to be devoted to monitoring and
enforcement. A system that is too complex can create significant ad-
ministrative, compliance, and funding difficulties for candidates, and
this burden is likely to weigh heaviest on those candidates and groups
which are new to political wars.3
When it comes to ease of administration, no system can beat that
of a private, unregulated system of funding, such as existed in all parts
of the United States until very late in the nineteenth century, when
laws regulating campaign finance first appeared. A completely un-
regulated system of campaign finance requires no government moni-
toring, auditing, or enforcement. There need be no federal agency of
any kind entrusted with regulating the system.4 Similarly, on the can-
didate side there is no need to devote resources to compliance, and
recordkeeping can be done with the needs of the candidate, rather
than government monitors, foremost in mind. Against a baseline of
unregulated private finance, extending government financing to con-
gressional races loses the test on ease of administration every time.
We do not, however, have an unregulated system of private fi-
nance, but rather one that, at the federal level, is quite heavily regu-
lated. It is unlikely that all regulation will end anytime soon; at a
minimum, disclosure of private campaign contributions seems here to
stay for the foreseeable future.5 Thus, a system of government financ-
3 See Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign
Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1082-83 (1996) (arguing that regulations hurt po-
litical novices because they do not have the experience to comply with and interpret
the law).
' This is not to say that there would not be routine law enforcement agencies en-
gaged in prevention of bribery, blackmail, and other crimes that happen to take place
in the context of political campaigns.
- But see McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (upholding the
right to engage in anonymous speech on non-candidate-specific political issues); Ami-
cus Curiae Brief of Gun Owners of America, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 1999 WL
374576, at *25-*29 (U.S. cert. grantedJan. 25, 1999) (No. 98-963) (arguing that forced
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ing of congressional campaigns may actually reduce administrative
costs from their current levels, though probably not to the level they
would be in a deregulated system. From a government perspective,
for example, the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") devotes far
fewer resources to administration of the federal presidential campaign
fund than to enforcement, audits, and disclosure.6 At the congres-
sional level, the lion's share of those enforcement, auditing, and dis-
closure costs are incurred because the system relies on regulated pri-
vate financing. If a government financing system were established
that succeeded in gaining the participation of most congressional
candidates, and were sufficiently simple to administer, it might lower
government administrative costs. Moreover, it might actually lower
costs for candidates as well, particularly if it succeeded in getting can-
didates out of the time-consuming and expensive fundraising business
altogether.
Coming up with such a simple system is not so easy. For one
thing, the Constitution, as correctly interpreted in Buckley v. Valeo7
prevents the government from simply requiring all candidates to take
public funds and limiting candidates' private spending. Thus candi-
dates must be drawn into, as this resolution puts it, "optional public
financing" and "voluntary spending limits." This could probably be
done with ease if we were willing to fund campaigns adequately from
the government till. We could provide, for example, a major party
Senate nominee in California with $30 million for the general elec-
tion, a Senate nominee in Ohio with $8 million, or a House nominee
in any district with $2 million or more. If we did, and such amounts
were indexed for inflation, I suspect that most candidates would ac-
cept the government subsidy and the accompanying spending limit.
Money, after all, has diminishing returns, and beyond the type of
spending levels suggested above additional spending will not be ex-
pected to translate into many votes, if any. Candidates would probably
find it worthwhile to take the money, accept the spending cap, and
devote time to activities other than fundraising.8
disclosure of campaign contributions violates the First Amendment).
6 See EC .1Y 2000 Budget Request (last modified Sept. 22, 1999) <http://www.fec.
gov/pages/budcont.htm> (allocating 2% of budget to campaign fund administration
while over 75% goes to enforcement, disclosure, and audits).
7424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976).
" Only 11 House candidates took in more than $2 million in the 1997-1998 elec-
tion cycle, and only 39 topped $1.5 million. See 1997-98, Top 50 House-Receipts (visited
Sept. 10, 1999) <http://www.fec.gov/press/hserec98.htm> (listing candidate fundrais-
ing totals).
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The problem is that we are not inclined to provide government
financing at such lavish levels. For example, Annelise Anderson has
estimated the cost of a reasonable communications program for a
presidential campaign to be at least $600,000,000.9 We presently pro-
vide major party presidential nominees with less than $65 million for
the general election campaign. Yet virtually all "reform" measures
suggest that we should lower, rather than increase, spending.
When subsidies are set too low, many candidates will be reluctant
to join voluntary government financing schemes, figuring that they
can raise more money and run a more effective campaign on private
contributions. To provide incentives for candidates to opt-in despite
low funding levels, many proposals for government funding include
complicated provisions that increase administrative costs and can
hamper grassroots candidacies. 10 Until "reformers" are willing to do
away with such complicated and generally punitive trigger mecha-
nisms and provide true incentives to take the public funds, it is likely
that most proposals for government funding will increase administra-
tive costs beyond those involved in the present system of regulated
private financing, and far beyond those in an unregulated, or at least
substantially deregulated, system of campaign finance.
B. Fexibility
A finance system should be flexible. Politics-in terms of issues,
personalities, technologies, and tactics-is a rapidly changing field.
Magazines such as Campaigns and Elections now exist for the purpose of
keeping campaign managers and tacticians up to date on the latest
developments in campaigning. A system that is geared to regulate or
subsidize the last campaign may "distort" politics, and in particular
runs the danger of "locking in" certain parties or candidates.11
9See ANNELISE ANDERSON, POLITIcAL MONEY: THE NEW PRomBrnON 7-8 (1997).
The figure is based on a campaign including: enough 80-second ads on network, ca-
ble, and local television in major media markets to reach most adults 10 times each;
three to four 80-minute cable "Fireside Chats"; radio ads attempting to reach listeners
in major radio markets five times each, one to two full page ads in every major news-
paper in the country; two pieces of direct mail sent to each potential voter, a videocas-
sette on the candidate sent to each household; and traditional billboards, buttons, and
bumper stickers. Id.
'0 See, e.g., Gable v. Patton, 142 F.8d 940, 947-49 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 1112 (1999) (discussing the extent of the financial pressure Kentucky's campaign
finance scheme puts on all candidates to participate).
" For example, ossified campaign finance laws, along with many other practices,
helped to lock in a Democratic majority in the U.S. House in the 1970s and 1980s. See
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Unfortunately, government is notoriously slow at adjusting to
changing realities. For example, not until 1999 did the FEC allow
campaign contributions made on-line via credit cards to count toward
federal matching funds in the presidential race, 2 or allow electronic
mail to be used to obtain payroll deductions for employee contribu-
tions to company political action committees ("PACs").'3 Yet in this
area the FEC has actually acted with relative speed-much faster than
Congress, for example, which has passed no legislation to clarify
whether or not it believes that the Federal Election Campaign Act
("FECA") applies to certain internet communications. Similarly,
Congress's 1974 enactment of a $1000 contribution limit has never
been adjusted, even though that limit has been eroded by inflation.
So bad is Congress's inertia that proponents of reforming that limit
are now urging the courts to step in to address the problem.
Political practices often evolve specifically in response to, and to
avoid the reach of, federal regulation. Long before passage of FECA,
unions created "political action committees" to avoid the ban on un-
ion contributions and gain an advantage for Democrats over Republi-
cans." Over the past twenty years we have seen the rise of independ-
ent expenditures and bundling, followed by the current rise in the
importance of "soft money" and "issue advocacy." Such tactics are
16used to garner electoral advantages for particular interests. Regula-
tion has often prevented opponents from responding quickly.'7 Sim-
LARRYJ. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRIY LrrLE SECRETS: THE PERSISTENCE OF
CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN PoLIrcs 49-57 (1996) (discussing the importance of frank-
ing, redistricting, campaign contributions, and committee structures to solidifying the
democratic majority in the House).
12 SeeAdvisory Opinion for Bill Bradley for President, Inc., 1999 WL 397749, at *4-
*5 (Federal Election Comm'n 1999).
" See Advisory Opinion for Nat'l Rural Letter Carriers' Ass'n, 1999 WL 300773, at
*4-*5 (Federal Election Comm'n 1999).
'4 SeeAmicus Curiae Brief of Senator Mitch McConnell, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't
PAC, 1999 WL 367218, at *14-417 (U.S. cert. granted Jan. 25, 1999) (No. 98-963) (ar-
guing that Buck/eys authorization of a $1000 limit on campaign contributions is so low
that it now represents a clear impediment to running a campaign).
'S See SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 11, at 50-53 (noting that the first political ac-
tion committee was created by the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and it threw
its support behind Democratic candidates, as did its successor).
'6 See, eg., it at 54-55 (describing how such tactics have been used by environ-
mental groups, pro-choice feminists, and trial lawyers to channel millions into Demo-
cratic coffers).
1 It is often not possible for opposing interests to take advantage of the same
technique as their adversaries. Different groups find different types of fundraising
techniques and political action are most effective. For example, trial lawyers use "bun-
dling" very effectively, many trial lawyers have incomes allowing them to donate $1000
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ply put, government cannot keep up with the fluid world of political
campaigning.
Furthermore, it has long been noted that one major difficulty in
reforming campaign finance laws is that most changes will be per-
ceived as benefiting either Republicans or Democrats. As both sides
will fight tooth and nail to block reform perceived as detrimental to
their political prospects, reform efforts are prone to gridlock.'8 If we
add to this the noted propensity of campaign finance regulation to be
particularly prone to the law of unintended consequences, 9 we have a
recipe for a system that creates more problems than it solves.
The alternative, we might note, is hardly more inviting-if
gridlock does not set in, we might see constant tinkering with the law
in an effort to gain partisan advantage. In short, campaign finance is
an area in which we cannot afford to have the law in constant flux,
due to the propensity of temporal majorities to aim for partisan ad-
vantage. Nor can we afford a static, heavily regulated system, due to
its distortive effects on political life. Campaign finance, we must
glumly come to realize, is a theatre in which the law is particularly ill-
equipped to act.
C. Opportunity
A third problem is to design a system that does not discourage
meaningful candidates from running. In this regard, the alleged
shortcomings of an unregulated private system are well documented
2 0
Potential candidates can be prevented from running for office by
their inability to raise the necessary funds, or discouraged from run-
ning by the difficulty of raising funds. Of course, this is more true in a
regulated private system than in an unregulated one. A system that
to a campaign. This technique will be less effective for a group such as National Right
to Life, whose members have lower incomes.
"s See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root ofAll Evil
Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFsRA L. REV. 301, 335-36 (1989) (noting that a reform proposal
by either party would probably work to the benefit of that party).
'9 See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Fnance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1705 (1999) ("Electoral reform is a graveyard of well-
intentioned plans gone awry."); Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 302-03 (discussing poten-
tial negative effects of campaign finance reform); Cass 1L Sunstein, Political Equality and
Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1400-11 (1994) (arguing that various
"reform" schemes wind up entrenching incumbents, producing more PACs, burdening
PACs that represent labor or minority groups, and increasing soft money or secret
gifts).
See generally Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 1 (arguing that financial resources are a
decisive factor in elections).
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limits the size of private contributions makes it harder for all candi-
dates to raise funds and almost always works against political outsiders
and newcomers by making it harder for them to raise money relative
to incumbents and well-known figures.
21
There is little reason to believe that there are a large number of
viable candidates for office who cannot raise the necessary funds in a
deregulated system, as opposed to one that limits private contribu-
tions and spending. Most people who would have any chance of run-
ning a serious campaign for office can attract the necessary funds; and
the freedom to raise and spend money increases the pool of viable
candidates.
Perhaps this can best be shown through a simple thought experi-
ment. Imagine that all campaign expenditures were banned. Who
would surface as viable candidates for Congress? I strongly suspect it
would be a small coterie of local celebrities (such as athletes, televi-
sion personalities, and car dealers whose names are well-known from
their business ads); current officeholders; a handful of successful
business persons, lawyers, and physicians who have been extremely ac-
tive in their professions or the community; and perhaps a few other
well-known community leaders, such as the head of the local police or
teachers' union, some community activists, or pastors of large
churches. Overall, it is a group not too different from that which runs
now, except probably a bit smaller in number and a bit less diverse. In
an unregulated system of private finance, virtually all of these people
could raise the money needed to run a serious campaign-in some
cases from a large number of small contributions, in others from a
small number of large contributions.2 The important thing is that
some people not in this group can also raise the funds to become vi-
able candidates.
As it is, candidates work frantically and spend their money in des-
perate attempts just to get the typical voter to know their names.23
21 See Smith, supra note 3, at 1072-73 (arguing that limits on contributions require
candidates to raise cash from a large number of small contributors, a process that is
easier for those with name recognition).
The current, heavily regulated system, however, works against many of these po-
tential challengers, especially those who begin with low name recognition. See id. at
1072 (arguing that officeholders have the advantages of established campaign organi-
zations, past contributors to target, and the ability to raise funds on an ongoing basis
from political action committees).
2 At the height of the campaign season, a majority of persons of voting age cannot
name either major party congressional candidate in their district. See Ilya Somin, Voter
Ignorance and theDemocratic Ideal, 12 CR.cAL REviEW 413, 417 (1998).
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One cannot win without name recognition. Spending money allows a
candidate without that initial name recognition to have a fighting
chance.24 What makes us think that the ability of some candidates to
spend money to gain name recognition somehow decreases the pool
of viable candidates? Does Steve Forbes decrease the pool of viable
Republican presidential nominees? Of course not. If anything, in
both 1996 and 2000 his presence as a candidate seems to have in-
creased interest in alternatives to the front runners, Bob Dole in 1996
and George W. Bush in 2000.
Nevertheless, a government finance system could potentially in-
crease the pool of candidates beyond that of a deregulated private sys-
tem by assuring that adequate financing is available to more candi-
dates. But it could decrease that pool of candidates as well, if the
incentives created to encourage acceptance of public financing make
it extremely unlikely that a privately financed candidate can win, while
at the same time setting the bar for government financing higher than
most candidates can reach.
The problem here is in deciding who ought to receive govern-
ment funds. Most observers seem to reject the notion that funds
should be available to every potential candidate, seeing such a loose
standard as a giveaway of public money. Funds need to be available
on a broad enough basis to encourage "legitimate" candidates, but
should not be so broadly available that the very availability of tax dol-
lars for campaigning promotes frivolous candidacies. For this reason,
most proposals for government financing require candidates to show
a measure of "popular support."
The current presidential financing system, for example, provides
"matching" funds to a candidate seeking his party's nomination who
raises at least $5000 in each of twenty states in amounts of $250 or
less.2s Contributions are then matched, up to $250 per contribution,
from the federal till. In the general election, party nominees receive
public funds to run their campaigns in an amount determined by
their showing in the last election.26
24 This has been shown in numerous studies that emphasize the need for political
challengers to spend enough to cross a viability threshold. Once across that threshold,
they have a legitimate chance of winning; below that threshold, defeat is all but cer-
tain. See Bradley A. Smith, A Most Uncommon Cause: Some Thoughts on Campaign Finance
Reform and a Response to Professor Paul, 30 CONN. L. REV. 831, 853 n.94 and sources cited
therein (1998) (discussing the impact of campaign spending on votes).
2 See26 U.S.C. §§ 9033(b), 9037 (1994).
See 26 U.S.C. § 9004 (1994). The system is structured to make certain that the
Republicans and Democrats will have the same amount of money in the general elec-
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This system appears to be both overinclusive and underinclusive
in terms of financing candidates. It is overinclusive in that, under the
system, a number of fringe candidates have qualified for federal
matching funds, most notably convicted felon Lyndon LaRouche;
John Hagelin of the Natural Law Party, which advocates greater use of
transcendental meditation as the key government policy; and Lenora
Fulani of the New Alliance Party, a socialist party which has been ac-
cused of engaging in cult-type brainwashing.2 It is also overinclusive
in that a party may be eligible for general election funds based on past
performance, even though it is unlikely to contest a future election. It
is under-inclusive because any new major third-party nominee would
not be eligible for funds prior to the general election.28
Other plans use other devices to cut the potential number of can-
didates who might make a claim on the government purse. For ex-
ample, so-called "Clean Money Campaign Reform" bills being pro-
moted by the lobbying group Public Campaign at the state level
require candidates to garner a substantial number of $5 contributions
in order to qualify for government funds. As introduced in the U.S.
Senate, a "Clean Money" bill requires the larger of either one thou-
sand $5 contributions or a number of $5 contributions equal to one
quarter of one percent of a state's voting age population!* I have no
way of knowing whether or not such a figure is too high or too low,
and the truth is that the promoters of these bills do not either. 3  The
tion and more than any other party's nominee.
See Jacqueline Salit, Breaking Bread with the Devils of Politics, NEWSDAY, Oct. 3,
1999, at B4 (discussing fringe candidates in the Reform Party).
Such a candidate can receive funds after the election if he tops five percent of
the vote. See 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a) (1994). However, this is of little use to the candidate
during the critical campaign before the election. Candidate John Anderson discovered
this in 1980, when he was unable to borrow campaign funds before the election based
on the anticipated receipt of federal funds after the election. Thus, Anderson's cam-
paign floundered for lack of funds when needed-before the election. See Elizabeth
Rada et al., Access to the Ballot, 13 URB. LAw. 793, 808 (1981) (discussing the constitu-
tional implications of the discriminatory impact of existing law on Anderson and other
independent candidates).
Clean Money, Clean Elections Act, S. 982, 106th Cong. § 502 (1999).
30 The Maine Civil Liberties Union has challenged a similar clause in Maine state
legislation. The ACLU argues that this functions as an unconstitutional barrier to
running for office, citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), which limited filing fees
for candidates. SeeDaggett v. Webster, 34 F. Supp. 2d 73, 74 (D. Me. 1999), vacated on
other grounds, 172 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 1999) (challenging Maine election law on First and
Fourteenth Amendment grounds).
3' One organization has described the proper figure as follows:
It must be high enough to screen out frivolous candidates who are unable to
demonstrate a threshold level of support. At the same time, it must be low
enough so as not to present a barrier to serious challengers.... It should also
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sponsors recognize that this threshold is likely to be manipulated by
incumbents seeking to protect their seats.
2
In any case, the "Clean Money" plans are also both under- and
overinclusive. They are underinclusive in that they will exclude late
starting candidates who might otherwise gain substantial support but
who do not have time to gather the necessary small contributions, and
they will exclude serious candidates who have available substantial
funds with which to campaign and raise name recognition, but who,
prior to using those funds to campaign, lack the necessary organiza-
tion, public support, and name recognition to gather lots of small
contributions.33
They are overinclusive in that candidates who are not viable can-
didates will still qualify. As the lobbyists for these "Clean Money" bills
admit, getting signatures on a petition is not truly representative of
any level of popular support.Y Getting $5 contributions is more diffi-
cult, and the theory is that few people will usually give money to a
cause with which they are not in agreement. However, I will speak
simply from personal experience: in my neighborhood a variety of
political groups, including Greenpeace and various Public Interest Re-
search Groups, regularly send young student volunteers or low-paid
workers through the neighborhood to collect $5 contributions for
various causes. These volunteers appear at the door, describe a horri-
ble problem facing the neighborhood, city, or state, and ask for a
small contribution. I assume by their regular appearances that they
be noted that the required number will need to be reviewed and, probably,
revised once the new law has been in effect.
Public Campaign, Clean Money Campaign Reform Annotated Model Legislation, comment to
§ 103(A)(2) (visited Oct 29, 1999) <http://www.publicampaign.org/model-bill/
bill 1.html#103>.
32 See id ("[I]t will be easier to revise the numbers upwards than downwards (in-
cumbents being unlikely to encourage more challengers)....").
This illustrates a typical "reform" trap of mistaking the purpose of campaigns
with the purpose of voting. The "Clean Money" acts are based on the premise that
spending should reflect a pre-existing level of public support. In fact, it usually will,
but there is no particular reason why it should: the purpose of spending money is to
gain public support, not merely to reflect pre-existing popularity.
U See Public Campaign, supra note 31, at comment to § 103 ("It's common knowl-
edge that many people will sign anything but that very few people will contribute even
a couple of dollars to a person or project they aren't in favor of."); see alsoPHILIP L.
DuBOIS & FLOYD F. FEENEY, IMPROVING THE CALFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS: OPTIONS
FOR CHANGE 84 (1992) ("[SIignatures... are simply not meaningful gauges of public
discontent or even interest."); Daniel H. Lowenstein & Robert M. Stern, The First
Amendment and Paid Initiative Petition Circulators: A Dissenting View and a Proposal 17
HASINGS CONST. L.Q. 175, 199-200 (1989) (arguing that factors other than public
support determine the success of a petition).
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find this to be a successful way to raise money. I doubt that most of
the donors have any real idea about the issues involved, and my con-
versations with neighbors who have contributed confirm this. I doubt,
therefore, that any real depth of public support will be found in col-
lecting $5 contributions through simplistic, one-sided presentations of
issues to voters who otherwise know little or nothing about the candi-
date.
Government-financed campaigns might therefore be better or
worse than a deregulated private system in promoting worthwhile
candidates. It will depend largely on where the threshold is set for
qualifying for funds. Given the uncertainties involved, the tendency
for incumbents to protect themselves, and the fact that even a rule
that at one point works well may periodically need revamping, which
may come slowly or not at all due to the lack of flexibility in the sys-
tem, I am skeptical that there is much to be gained from tax funding.
D. Competitiveness
Very similar problems arise when it comes to fostering competitive
races. Professor Briffault argues that "[p]ublic funding would make
the electoral process more competitive," but the comparison he makes
is between a tax-funded system with adequate campaign funds, and a
heavily regulated private system.s In fact, since the era of heavy fed-
eral campaign finance regulation began in 1974, incumbent re-
election rates have continued to rise and the number of competitive,
or marginal, districts to decrease.36 Of course it is not clear that this
trend is not a mere statistical blip, or perhaps caused by political
background factors.37 It is certainly not true that this trend as a whole
can be laid at the feet of campaign finance regulation. There are,
however, reasons why limits on contributions and spending within a
Brifiault, supra note 2, at text following note 78.
See GARY C. JACOBSON, THE ELECTORAL ORIGINS OF DIVIDED GOvuNMRNT:
COMPETION IN U.S. HOUsE ELECTIONS, 1946-1988 at 26-29 (1990) (reporting that the
percentage of marginal incumbents-those winning with less than 60% of the two-
party vote-declined dramatically from 1974 to 1988); DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN,
ELECTION LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 654-58 (1995) (reporting that in terms of both
vote percentage and re-election rates, incumbents in House elections have maintained
an overwhelming electoral advantage since the mid-1960s); DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN &
RICHARD L HASEN, ELECTION LAW: SUPPLEMENT 1999-2000, at 84 (1999) (demonstrat-
ing that the same trend has continued in the last two House election cycles).
37 See, eg.,JACoBSON, supra note 36, at 133 ("Electoral swings have been modest in
recent elections because national conditions and issues have not been conducive to
change.").
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privately financed contribution system distort political campaigns in
favor of incumbents.38 For instance, prior to the passage of FECA,
challengers in U.S. House races tended to raise about $0.67 for every
dollar raised by incumbents. After FECA, that number dropped to
about $0.25 by a challenger for every dollar raised by incumbents be-
fore rebounding somewhat to its recent level of $0.42 per incumbent-
raised dollar.39
Whether or not government financing will improve the situation
of challengers relative to a deregulated private system is open for de-
bate. In those two states which have meaningful experience with tax
financing for their state legislatures, studies of government financing
systems have yielded mixed results. A 1995 study of Minnesota's sys-
tem by Patrick Donnay and Graham Ramsden concluded that Minne-
sota's system "promises more competitive campaigns, but does not go
far toward creating them."40 A study of Wisconsin's system by Kenneth
Mayer and John Wood seemed to yield a similar result. They con-
cluded that "public financing has had no effect at all on the level of
electoral competition," and "public financing of congressional elec-
tions, by itself, will not eliminate the problem of uncompetitive elec-
tions."4' In a later study, however, Professor Mayer argues that "a well-
designed and adequately funded public finance program can dra-
matically increase competition levels."2
So, will government financing foster competitive elections? Again,
it depends on the type of financing system that might be adopted. For
example, to the extent that government financing with a spending cap
equalizes expenditures, it might help challengers, who are usually out-
spent even in a deregulated system. Public financing, however, also
See Smith, supra note 3, at 1072-75 (arguing that contribution limits benefit in-
cumbents, who have fundraising advantages and generally need to spend less because
they benefit from office-related press coverage and name recognition).
-9 See NORMANJ. ORNSTEIN ET AL, VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS, 1997-1998, at
87 (1998) (listing challenger/incumbent spending ratios from 1976 to 1996 for the
U.S. House of Representatives).
40 Patrick D. Donnay & Graham P. Ramsden, Public Financing of Legislative Elections:
Lessons from Minnesota, 20 LEGIs. STUD. Q. 351, 362 (1995). The authors attribute this
failure to the program's design which, not surprisingly, gives more benefits to incum-
bents than to challengers. See id.
41 Kenneth R. Mayer & John M. Wood, The Impact of Public Financing on Electoral
Competitiveness: Evidence from Wisconsin, 1964-1990, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 69, 70, 86
(1995).
42 KENNETH R. MAYER, PUBLIC FINANCING AND ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN
MINNESOTA AND WISCONSIN 17 (1998). Mayer argues that the true measure of com-
petitiveness is less how many incumbents actually lose than how many are involved in
close races. See id. at 8.
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prevents challengers from ever spending more than incumbents.
Given the tremendous value of incumbency, many believe that chal-
lengers are only on equal footing with incumbents when they can
spend more43 Challengers in a position to spend more than an in-
cumbent are usually the strongest challengers. Thus, a flat spending
cap may harm those challengers most likely to actually defeat an in-
cumbent.
Complicating the question further, strong evidence suggests that
the key variable is not really who outspends whom, but whether chal-
lengers spend "enough" to make their names and positions known to
the public.4 Thus, a government financing system with an expendi-
ture cap that sets the limits high enough may make races more com-
petitive, while a system that sets the spending level too low may make
races less competitive. The presence of adequate funding is a key
element to Mayer's 1998 findings that public financing can "dramati-
cally increase" competition.45
But can we expect government to set funding at adequate levels?
46As Professor Mayer notes, Wisconsin has failed to do so. One reason
that it is difficult to assure that government funding is both enacted or
maintained at adequate levels is that it is easily criticized as "welfare
for politicians," and as an unnecessary state expense in any period of
budget cutbacks or austerity.47 There is, quite simply, "no hint of a po-
43 SeeRaskin & Bonifaz, supra note 1, at 289 (finding that the financial advantage of
incumbency has two aspects: public self-subsidies Congress bestows on its members,
and private money seeking legislative influence).
4 See, e.g., ALAN I. ABRAMOWrIZ &JEFFREYA. SEGAL, SENATE ELECTIONS 139 (1992)
("[D]ollar for dollar, spending by challengers and open seat candidates should pro-
duce a greater electoral return than spending by incumbents."); GARY C. JACOBSON,
THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 130-32 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing the cor-
relation between a challenger's level of campaign spending and the probability that a
voter will report having contact or familiarity with him or her); Alan I. Abramowitz,
Explaining Senate Election Outcomes, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 385, 397 (1988) (concluding
that "[t]he challenger's campaign expenditures are the single most important variable
affecting an incumbent senator's chances of being reelected"); Jeffrey Milyo, The Elec-
trical [sic] Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections (visited Oct. 15, 1999) <http:
//www.igs.berkeley.edu:8880/CRF/RS/milyo.html> (suggesting that incumbents that
marginally outspend their challengers do not benefit from their additional expendi-
tures) ).
4s See MAYEI, supra note 42, at 3-4 (describing Minnesota's system as successful, in
part because it has higher spending limits and allows for different levels of expendi-
tures in different types of races-including a 10% increase in spending for first time
candidates).
46 See id. at 2, 17-19 (noting that Wisconsin's spending limits have remained the
same since 1986).
47 See id. at 17 (challenging the notion that public funding has a negative effect on
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litical will to dramatically expand the levels of [public] financing."8 A
partial solution to the problem of the public's miserly attitude toward
government financing of campaigns can be found in a creative pro-
posal by Professor Daniel Hays Lowenstein.4 9 Lowenstein proposes
that government funds go not to candidates, but to political parties,
which could then distribute the funds. The advantage to this system is
that party leaders should tend to spend their funds on competitive
races, but will not provide substantial funds for races that appear to be
lopsided. This should support competitive races while keeping overall
costs lower than if equal funding were given to each candidate. Not
only would this be a more efficient use of campaign funds, but it
could keep "safe" incumbents from further entrenching themselves
through large spending in a non-competitive race-thus making a
competitive race more likely in the future. This is, at best, only a par-
tial solution; there will still be pressure to lower the amounts provided
to uncompetitive levels. Indeed, since many Americans distrust politi-
cal parties, Lowenstein's proposal, if enacted, may actually increase
the antipathy to providing adequate funds.0
A second reason why spending caps will likely be set too low is
simply that incumbents, who want to be reelected, will set the levels of
the caps. For example, when Congress debated spending caps in
1997, the bills establishing those caps set the spending limit at a level
at which challengers could not be competitive."' Every challenger
spending less than the proposed limit in Senate campaigns had lost in
each of the 1994 and 1996 elections, whereas every incumbent spend-
ing less than the limit had won. Similarly, only 3% of challengers
spending less than the proposed limit for House races had won in
1996, whereas 40% of challengers spending more than that limit had
won. It is not necessary to attribute pernicious intentions to legisla-
tors to realize the danger that limits will constantly be set too low. In-
cumbents, who already have substantial name recognition and know
the level of electoral competition).
48 Issacharoff& Karlan, supra note 19, at 1735.
4 Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 351 (outlining a reform package for general elec-
tions using a "party allocation system").
so See Alan Greenblatt, Politics and Marketing Merge in Parties' Bid for Relevanc4 55
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1967, 1969 (1997) (citing 1997 statistics showing that 48% of the
electorate, a plurality, identified themselves with neither political party).
5' See S. 25, 105th Cong. § 503(d) (1) (1997) (setting a spending limit of $5.5 mil-
lion for Senate races); H.R. 493, 105th Cong. § 502(b)(1)(101) (1997) (setting a
spending limit of $600,000 for House races).
12 See Bradley A. Smith, Why Campaign Finance Reform Never Works, WALL ST. J., Mar.
19, 1997, at A19 (citing statistics compiled from FEC reports).
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how much they need to run an effective campaign, may simply have
forgotten how much challengers need to spend to run an effective
campaign.
Worse, even if the original grant seems adequate, it may not re-
main so. For example, in the federal system, it appears that the
amounts allotted to the major parties for the general election of the
president, even though adjusted for inflation, are no longer ade-
quate.0 This deficiency has prompted increased spending on "issue
advocacy" and increased amounts of "soft money" contributions.5 In
Wisconsin, spending limits have not been raised since 1986, becom-
ing, in the process, woefully inadequate.5 Thus, we see that the lack
of flexibility within a government financing campaign, coupled with
political pressures to reduce spending, makes it difficult to keep gov-
ernment grants and limits adequate, even if they were adequate when
first enacted.
Of course, the argument that the spending cap may be set too low
is easily rebutted by proposing a program-such as Minnesota's, per-
haps-in which the cap is set at an appropriate level and indexed for
inflation. But it is legitimate to question whether the incentives and
dynamics of the issue make it more likely than not that a government
financing system will come to favor incumbents. Professor Briffault is
correct in suggesting that a tax finance system can assure that all can-
didates, especially challengers, have the critical mass of funds neces-
sary to make them competitive. That same system, however, can also
be used to lock in incumbents and deter serious challengers. Consid-
ering the limited experience at the state and federal level and what we
know about political behavior, a government financing system could
increase competitiveness, but probably will not.
See Stephen Ansolabehere &James M. SnyderJr., Money and Institutional Power,
77 TEX. L. REV. 1673, 1704 (1999) (finding that increases in the presidential campaign
limit have failed to match the similar increases for congressional races because the lim-
its are indexed to different economic indicators).
4 See id. at 1702-04. "Issue ads" are advertisements that may be intended to influ-
ence voters by discussing candidates' views on issues, but which stop short of urging
people to vote one way or another. "Soft money" consists of unregulated contributions
made to political parties, rather than candidates, for purposes of party building, which
may include "issue advertising." See Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The
ConstitutionalProhibition on a Soft Money Ban, 24J. LEGIS. 179, 182-84 (1998) (examining
the links between soft money and issue advocacy).
mSee Mayer, supra note 42, at 2 (comparing Wisconsin's campaign spending limits
to those of Minnesota where higher limits and an indexing system have more effec-
tively fostered competition).
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E. Communication
While addressing the difficulty of providing for funds adequate to
foster competition, we have already considered the electoral advan-
tages of incumbency. One reason that incumbents do well when
spending caps are set too low is that voters are deprived of both in-
formation about challengers and information that challengers would
provide about incumbents. Because voters start with more informa-
tion on incumbents, but rarely with any concerted effort to find po-
tential flaws with the incumbent, low spending favors incumbents.
Also, because challengers are less well-known, and usually receive less
free coverage than incumbents (by virtue of not holding office or en-
gaging in the public acts and discussion that go with holding office),
low spending tends to penalize challengers. Again, it is certainly pos-
sible to devise a government system that provides for adequate funds,
but there is little reason to think that such a result is likely or, even if
temporarily achieved, that funding levels will remain adequate. With-
out campaign spending, voters' information is limited to what they
can get through the free media.
A deregulated private system may not always provide adequate
funds to challengers, but given that the general thrust of political re-
form efforts is to reduce the amount spent on political campaigns, I
am not optimistic that government financing will increase voter edu-
cation levels.
Unlike some supporters of government financing, Professor Brif-
fault resists the temptation to demonize private financing, providing a
generally balanced account. But the model of private financing
against which he compares government financing is the current,
highly regulated model, rather than the alternative of a deregulated
system. Even if he avoids demonizing private financing (heavily regu-
lated or not), his vision of a government-financed system is quite ide-
alized.
Overall, there are no guarantees that a tax-financed system will
perform better than a deregulated private system judged on any of
these criteria of administrability, flexibility, opportunity, competitive-
ness, or communication. Tax financing does offer potential im-
provements in some areas, but what we know about politics and gov-
ernment regulation suggests that such benefits are unlikely to be
realized. In fact, negative consequences are perhaps the more likely
result.
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II. CLASHINGVISIONS: EQUAITlYAND CORRUPTION
I have set aside, until now, the two prime arguments usually of-
fered up in support of tax financing: that it is necessary to assure
equality and to prevent corruption. The resolution we have been
asked to discuss assumes two extremely important facts. First, it pre-
sumes that there is some problem, described as "the political influ-
ence of special interests," which must be addressed. Second, it pre-
sumes that taxpayer financing and spending limits will solve this
problem. Given that there are no particular advantages to govern-
ment financing outside of the alleged benefits for equality and control
of corruption, we should closely examine each of these assumptions.
The first I examine here, the second in Part IV.
A. The Question of Influence
When we say that we want to control the influence of "special in-
terests," we need first to remember that one person's "special interest"
is another's "vital national interest." Rarely does a labor union leader
stride boldly to the microphone and announce that his members favor
a prevailing wage law because they want as much as possible for them-
selves, taxpayers take the hindmost. Rarely does a corporate executive
argue that import duties are bad for the country, but he does not care
so long as his company benefits. More subtly, is the Sierra Club a
"citizens' lobby" or a "special interest"? It may depend on whether
you want to hike in the wilderness and preserve species, or drive on
the freeway and preserve jobs in the timber industry. How about the
National Rifle Association? The United Auto Workers? The Grange?
Are they "special interests" or "citizens' groups"? Until we can all
agree on the answers to these questions, I am not sure that the idea of
combating "special interests" gets us very far. I personally oppose tar-
iffs and import quotas on foreign textiles. Try telling the employee
about to lose her job due to cheap textile imports that she is a "special
interest." This problem alone should make us skeptical of trying to
reign in "special interests."
Assuming that we could agree on the answers to these questions,
we would still have the problem of defining what kind of influence we
want to block. The object of participating in politics is to have "influ-
ence" in the political system. If it were not, why would anyone partici-
pate?6 Thus, the editors' proposition seems to presume that certain
See Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable Di-
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types of influence are in some way illegitimate and need to be con-
trolled or eliminated. Further, it presumes that such influence is
linked to political contributions. Political contributions can arguably
provide influence in two different ways. The first is that they alter the
way in which legislators behave while in office. The second is that
they affect the way that voters vote. The first is usually the subject of
the anti-corruption argument, and the second, the "equality" argu-
ment. I will take up the equality issue first.
B. Equality
In Buckley, the Supreme Court held that the pursuit of equality is
an insufficiently compelling government interest to justify infringe-
ments on the First Amendment. 7 This holding, however, hardly takes
the issue off the table. Equality can certainly be a legitimate political
objective, and its pursuit in a constitutional manner-such as through
a truly voluntary system of government financing-may be a sound
policy objective. However, the notion that removing one source of
political influence from politics (money) while leaving others (such as
writing and organizational ability) intact will add to equality is based
on a combination of dubious empirical assertions, a romantic notion
of politics, and a core philosophical definition of equality that is cer-
tainly debatable.
The first empirical assertion is the unproven and rather unlikely
notion that other sources of political influence-such as good looks,
speaking ability, time, or more importantly, celebrity, writing ability,
free media access, campaign organizational skills, and the like-are
more evenly spread across the populace and the political spectrum
than is wealth.s This view is unlikely because it seems rather clear that
lemmas, 94 COLuM. L. REv. 1258, 1267 (1994) (questioning the logic behind campaign
finance reform in light of its goal for achieving political equality).
57 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (invalidating certain provisiops of
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, as violative of the
First Amendment).
" See Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1646 n.101 (1999) (arguing that those with personal attributes,
such as celebrity, capable of affecting the electoral process are evenly spread across the
political spectrum). Professor Hasen casually asserts the proposition that "celebrity
views are likely to be randomly distributed on the political spectrum." Id. at 1646
n.101. I find this a most curious assertion for several reasons. First, Hasen never
makes an effort to prove it or even to show that it flows logically from some proposi-
tion. Since it is not at all obvious to me, or to most people with whom I communicate
regularly, that this is true, I have to discount this assertion. Second, I do not under-
stand why Professor Hasen would be convinced that "corporations" (meaning the peo-
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in virtually every major political debate or campaign, both sides (or all
sides with any serious measure of popular support) are reasonably
well-financed. Moreover, because wealth is a reward generally avail-
able to those who gain success in athletics, in Hollywood, through
campaign consulting, and most any other profession, persons with
other sources of influence tend to be subsets of those with wealth. It
is to be expected that the larger group of "people with money" will
have a broader spectrum of political views than any given subset. If
this is true, barring monetary contributions but leaving other sources
of influence intact will lead to fewer, not more, views being repre-
sented.59
It is also argued that money must be excluded because unlimited
spending allows some voices to "drown out" others. This is empirically
not true. There are now so many media outlets-including maga-
zines, twenty-four hour news channels (including two exclusively de-
voted to government), a booming talk-radio market, the internet, and
more, available for free or virtually so (visit the local library)-that a
prospective voter can get just about any perspective he or she might
conceivably want.6 We must not mistake the listener's disinterest for
the communicator's inability to speak.
Of course, most of these low cost information sources must be
sought out by the voter. A well-financed candidate can simply blast
passive viewers with television ads, but this does not "drown out the
opponent." At worst, it simply means that many voters-those who get
all their information from television ads-hear only one side (assum-
ing only one side has sufficient funds to run ads-a dubious assump-
tion in many, if not most, serious campaigns). The argument for
ple who run and own them) share common political views, but people in other walks
of life who have greater than average political influence, such as Hollywood or acade-
mia, would not have certain widely shared views within their professional circles. See id.
at 1646. Finally, if Professor Hasen really does perceive such a difference, is his game
not up? For it would then appear that his goal is to disadvantage certain political view-
points (those held by corporate owners and managers) rather than to promote any
particular type of "equality." If one is truly interested in "equality," I am puzzled as to
why celebrities, academics, reporters, campaign consultants, and others with "undue"
political influence should be allowed to have such influence, regardless of the distribu-
tion of their views along the political spectrum.
" This argument might fail if these subsets of wealthy people tend to dispropor-
tionately share a common political philosophy with all other people of wealth. In this
case, banning money will make no difference.
'0 See Issacharoff& Karlan, supra note 19, at 1726 (noting the ease with which con-
sumers of political news can obtain information about competing viewpoints). But cf.
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV.
893, 902-03 (1998) (discussing how inequality of opportunity to reach a voter does not
rest primarily on a candidate's resources, but on the voter's level of interest).
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campaign spending limits seems to assume that we would be better off
if those voters heard from neither side before heading off to vote.
This is a puzzling perspective, and one which would almost certainly
leave politics to a mix of car salesmen, television anchormen, sports
stars, state and local officeholders, and those few others who might al-
ready possess local name recognition-a more narrow group than the
current crop of candidates.
The solution to the problem of limited voter information, again, is
to increase spending by candidates so that all are heard. A govern-
ment finance system with adequate spending levels might do this; one
with inadequate spending levels will not, and will probably be worse
than an unregulated private system. The problem, again, is what kind
of financing system the political system is actually likely to yield.
The idea that money is in some way different from other sources
of political influence also draws on a romantic idea of politics. All of
us do not have equal monetary resources, but in theory, at least, all of
us can volunteer to walk a precinct, man a phone bank, stuff enve-
lopes, or write a letter to the editor.6 ' Twenty-four hours spent work-
ing on a campaign by most Americans, however, are certainly not as
valuable as are twenty-four hours of James Carville's time spent work-
ing on the same campaign. To put it another way, what the "average"
citizen can do, non-monetarily, for a campaign-stuff envelopes, dis-
tribute a few brochures door to door, and the like-is the equivalent
of a ten to twenty dollar campaign donation. But there are some citi-
zens-campaign managers such as Carville; activist celebrities such as
Arnold Schwarzenegger, Lauren Bacall, or Barbara Streisand; writers
such as George Will or Elaine Goodman-whose political influence
far, far exceeds those of most citizens. Campaign endorsements or
participation by such individuals are the equivalent of $5,000, $50,000
and $250,000 donations.6 As with money contributions, most citizens
are capable only of small contributions of non-monetary resources,
while only a select few "large donors" can really wield significant influ-
61 Of course, the reality is that we are not all equal there, either-even those of us
with strongly held political views. My 91-year-old grandmother can no longer do any of
those things, but when it comes to politics, "don't get her started. ... "
62 Surely, all the ink spilt by the many talented and well-positioned advocates
amounts to a multi-million dollar sub rosa subsidy to those political candidates run-
ning on a reform platform. My participation in this debate rests on the conviction that
each citizen should be able to use every asset, skill, or talent he or she possesses to
promote his or her views. Does not the reformers' agenda suggest that every citizen's
voice should be reduced to the level of the least able participant? And if so, how do
theyjustify the use of their unusual privilege and talent to be heard?
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ence. Professor Briffault tells us that just 235,000 people contributed
one-third of the private money for federal campaigns in 199 6 .63 Leav-
ing aside the millions of donors who contributed the remaining bulk
of the private funds, I am quite certain that 235,000 is a considerably
larger group than the number of people who were offered op-ed
space in daily newspapers; or the number of people who served as
campaign managers in federal campaigns; or the number of people
who filed amicus briefs in the Supreme Court; or the number of peo-
ple who head advocacy groups arguing for campaign finance reform.
Indeed, I am quite certain that these large donors make up a more
numerous and more diverse group than all of the above combined-
and yet comprise a group with less political influence than the above.
Professor Briffault adds that these 235,000 are not typical of all Ameri-
cans.64 Not to be overly flippant, but tell us something that we do not
know aboutjournalists, consumer "activists," or most any other class of
people wielding political power. Tell us something, indeed, that we
do not know about the elected representatives themselves. Let us fo-
cus not just on the "evil" attributes of these 235,000 (they are more
likely to be "affluent, men, [and] whites" as well as "more conservative
... [and] more Republican");65 let us also consider that compared to
most other people with political influence, they are less likely to work
for government, less likely to be college professors, more likely to have
met a payroll, more likely to live outside of the federal capital, less
likely to be Democrats, and in each of these and many other ways,
they are more like "the general population." In short, though they
are in many ways different from 'the general population,' in a great
many other ways they are more like the general population than those
whose influence would increase if these 235,000 were cut out of the
process.
At this point, the debate over equality tends to shift to philosophi-
cal ground, with supporters and opponents of banning private contri-
butions arguing for very different views of what constitutes "equality."
Much has been written on the subject,6 and I doubt that we can add
63 See Briffaul, supra note 2, at text accompanying notes 40-41.
"See id. at text accompanying notes 41-42.
65 Id at text accompanying note 42.
6See, e.g., Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence" A Threat to Liberty,
in THFrE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 225, 228 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds.,
1992); Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the irst Amendment and
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1985) (noting that defenders of
lenientjudicial scrutiny for campaign finance reform legislation argue that equalizing
access to the political process is intrinsically related to the First Amendment); Edward
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much here beyond a brief summary of those competing views.
We might call those who would like to destroy monetary participa-
tion in politics the Platonists. Platonists believe that individuals
blessed with certain types of talents are inherently entitled to greater
political influence than their fellow citizens. The Platonist view holds
that citizens with skills and attributes directly valuable to politics-
speaking, writing, political organizing, media access (as with
celebrities), good looks, etc.-deserve their unequal political
influence, and by right and breeding ought to serve as platonic
"rulers" of the republic's body politic.7 Therefore, inequalities in
these attributes should not concern us. Those who possess other
skills-in medicine, business, computers, or manufacturing, for
example---may or may not deserve the wealth that their skills bring
to them, but they definitely do not deserve political influence.69 Thus,
expenditures of money by such individuals, or what we should recog-
nize as efforts to convert their non-political skills into political influ-
ence, are illegitimate. And because wealth is not equally distributed
across the populace, this type of influence is a great concern.
Against this view stand those whom we might dub the Stoics. The
Stoic thinkers on campaign finance believe in strict equality before
the law. In this view, all citizens should have an equal opportunity to
use their talents-any talents-to influence political life. This means
B. Foley, Equal Dollars Per Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1206 (1994) ("[E]ach eligible voter should receive the same
amount of financial resources for... participating in electoral politics."); Stephen E.
Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign Finance Reform, 18 HOFSTRAL. REV. 213, 220
(1989) (noting that the very definition of equality is a contested concept in this area);
Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitaian/Public Choice Defense of
Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 27 (1996) (arguing that a voucher plan
would best serve egalitarian pluralism); Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 1, at 278-79 (pos-
iting that equal protection "provides the principal constitutional paradigm" for analyz-
ing questions about the political process).
67 See PLATO, THE REPUBUIC OF PLATO chs. VIII-X (Francis MacDonald Cornford
trans., 1961); id. at 122 ("[]f a state is constituted on natural principles, the wisdom it
possesses as a whole will be due to the knowledge residing in the smallest part, the one
which takes the lead and governs the rest.").
0' These positions are the modern equivalent of the craftsmen, merchants, and la-
borers in Plato's Republic. According to Plato, though necessary to an economically
sound state, "on intellectual grounds they are hardly worth including in our society."
Id. at 58.
69 SeeE. Joshua Rosenkranz, Faulty Assumptions in "Faulty Assumptions": A Response to
Professor Smith's Critiques of Campaign Finance Reform, 30 CONN. L. REV. 867, 894 (1998)
("The power of persuasion, which involves skills 'such as writing and speaking goes to
the heart of what the First Amendment is about....' [Mioney spent to broadcast an
idea is completely unrelated to the value of the idea it propels or the influence of the
message on the listener.").
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that citizens must be allowed to convert all of their abilities into politi-
cal influence in the form of contributions. This is a broader, more
plebian, more free-wheeling conception of democracy which allows
more people to play the game.70 It denies that certain political views
have inherent merit merely because the speaker possesses certain
types of skills. Rather, it promotes equality before the law.71 Stoic
thinkers are relatively unconcerned, then, when an individual or
group of individuals gives or pays money to a candidate, a political
party, an ad agency, or some other group to promote political views
similar to those of the contributor. Stoics see this as enhancing equal-
ity by allowing all politically involved citizens to use their diverse assets
to promote their political beliefs. The fact that monetary assets are
unevenly distributed, as are the political skills of writing, speaking,
managing campaigns and so forth, is of little concern to Stoics, who
accept it as a fact of life. The Stoic view is inherently unattractive to
academics, journalists, and "good government" lobbyists. These peo-
ple tend to possess skills with direct political utility and also tend to
believe that their political views are better informed than those of
most citizens. Naturally then, they are drawn to the Platonist vision,
which affirms their greater worthiness to participate in political dis-
cussion and grants them greater political power.7
The philosophical conflict between the Platonist and Stoic views
of campaign finance is not one that can be resolved here, but there is
another aspect to the discussion. On a practical level, there are those
of us who doubt that most campaign finance regulation accomplishes
what it is intended to accomplish. Thus, we have argued that even ac-
cepting the Platonist definition of equality favored by self-styled "re-
formers," regulation-including government financing-both has
70 See Gottlieb, supra note 66, at 284 ("[W]hen the public needs 'a choice, not an
echo,' a wide-open system of campaign finance may prove appropriate."); Issacharoff&
Karlan, supra note 19, at 1732 ("[F]or some people, the most articulate statements of
their political preferences they can make involve contributing money .... "); Smith,
supra note 2, at 73-76 (concluding that money allows more voices to be heard, while
limiting campaign contributions tends to silence voices).
71 See RIcHARD PIPES, PROPER Y AND FREEDOM 12 (1999) (explaining briefly the
history and nature of Stoicism).
7 Professors Issacharoffand Karlan have made the same observation:
Thus, it is hardly surprising that the scholarly argument for campaign reform
would produce a world in which intellectuals would have more influence and
the persons they have chosen not to be-businessmen or people who devote
their working hours to earning a living in a fashion that does not involve hav-
ing and disseminating deep political thoughts-will have less.
Issacharoff& Karlan, supra note 19, at 1731.
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been and will continue to be a bad thing.? Regulation, by its very na-
ture, casts the heaviest burden on those who lack the resources to hire
lawyers, accountants, and consultants to advise them on the law and
their campaigns. It also favors incumbents and others who already
know how to play the system and use it against their opponents. 74 Re-
stricting influence through campaigning can increase the influence of
those with a permanent presence at the seat of government; this
group consists overwhelmingly of powerful industrial and union inter-
ests, not lobbyists for the disorganized and disempowered.7
Moreover, if I am right about the lack of flexibility in government
finance systems and the tendency of incumbent lawmakers to skew sys-
tems to their advantage, these "undemocratic" consequences of cam-
paign finance regulation may be all but unavoidable in a tax-financed
system. At least in theory, a better system might be developed. I am
skeptical, however, that proponents of government financing can de-
sign a plan that will do what they hope it will.
C. Corruption
The second interest allegedly furthered by tax financing of cam-
paigns is the elimination of a second type of "special interest" influ-
ence-influence in the political process after the votes are counted.
This is often referred to by regulatory advocates as "corruption."T6 As
7 See THOMAS GAIS, IMPROPER INFLUENCE 181 (1996) (arguing that past electoral
reforms and regulations have led to representational deficiencies in the FAC system);
BeVier, supra note 66, at 1076 (arguing that commentators favoring campaign finance
reform discount the value of the contributors' First Amendment rights); Gottlieb, su-
pra note 66, at 286-92 (pointing out the potential adverse impact of campaign finance
reform proposals on First Amendment rights); Smith, supra note 3, at 1050 (arguing
that campaign finance regulation conflicts with accepted notions of equality and is un-
democratic); see also Joel M. Gora, Campaign Finance Reform. Still Searching Today for a
Better Way, 6J.L. & POL'Y 137, 165 (1997) (noting that the constitutionality of many
proposed reforms is suspect); Sanford Levinson, Regulating Campaign Activity, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 939, 948-49 (1985) (book review) (arguing that campaign finance reform does
not address the fact that other socially useful resources which can affect electoral re-
sults are also unequally distributed).
74 See Smith, supra note 3, at 1083 ("[C]ampaign enforcement actions are dispro-
portionately directed at challengers, who are less likely to have staff familiar with the
intricacies of campaign finance regulation.").
75 See GAs, supra note 73, at 132 (noting that "the PAC system highlights certain
policy domains and underrepresents others"); see also Edward A. Kangas, Soft Money and
Hard Bargains, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1999, at A27 (arguing that "lobbyists and trade as-
sociations" would allow big business "to be heard" even if soft money were banned and
supporting such a ban).
76 See, e.g., Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Rform: A Key
TAXPAYER-FUNDED POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS
always, we need to begin this debate by pointing out that by "corrup-
tion," reform advocates do not mean traditional bribery. Traditional
bribery in terms of funds that line the lawmaker's pockets in exchange
for specific official action is already outlawed. What regulatory advo-
cates seem to mean by corruption is that lawmakers will vote in certain
,ays, once in office, in order to please contributors, rather than in
some other, better manner.77 I find it rather implausible that this is
really a major problem in American government.
For one thing, the assertion that lawmakers vote to please finan-
cial contributors is simply not supported by the bulk of systematic evi-
dence. Serious studies of legislative behavior have overwhelmingly
concluded that campaign contributions play little role in floor vot-
ing78 and these conclusions are no longer seriously disputed by the
would-be regulators.7 Instead, it is now argued that the corruption
exists where it is harder to see-in committee activities, in "the speech
not given," and in prioritizing. Of course, if "corruption" cannot be
measured or seen, this assertion cannot be disproven, which is some-
thing of a handicap to labor under for those of us skeptical of this jus-
tification. On the other hand, this assertion is backed only by bits of
anecdotal evidence, usually quotes from present and former legisla-
tors explaining their support for campaign finance regulation or ex-
plaining why they were unable to accomplish certain legislative objec-
tives.80 This evidence is not terribly persuasive. There is a human
tendency to blame defeat on "unfair" factors such as "corruption,"
rather than to admit that our ideas were not strong enough, our allies
not numerous enough, or our side not organized enough, to gain leg-
islative victory. There are also anecdotal quotes running in the oppo-
to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLJM. L. REV. 1126, 1159 (1994) (describ-
ing the current system for financing congressional campaigns as "corrupting").
See Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14
CONsT. COMMENTARY 127, 131 (1997) (outlining subtler forms of corruption under
which lawmakers perform their duties with monetary considerations in mind).
See i at 139 n.45 and sources cited therein (indicating that "contributions do
influence representatives, but less than many suppose"); see also Stephan G. Bronars &
John R. Lott, Jr., Do Campaign Donations Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Sup-
pod Candidates Who Value the Same Things That They Do? 40 J.L. & EcoN. 317, 346
(1997) (concluding that empirical data fail to support the notion that campaign con-
tributions buy politicians' votes).
But seeRosenkranz, supra note 69, at 877 (arguing that even though the presence
of corruption is not supported by voting pattern studies, it still pays a major role in in-
fluencing representatives).
8' See, e.g., Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 76, at 1129 (quoting former Senator
Paul Douglas, who feared that the influence of money and favors "may be so subtle as
not to be detected by the official himself').
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site direction." In addition, there is the inability of regulatory advo-
cates to actually name corrupt legislators or episodes of such "corrup-
tion." The fact is, it is still shocking when episodes such as "Abscam"
and the "Keating Five" come to light, precisely because such episodes
are rare. Conventional wisdom aside, most people do not do it.
A bit of reflection tells us why it is unlikely that money "corrupts"
the legislature to any great extent. For one thing, personal convic-
tion, party agenda, and public opinion seem far more logical explana-
tions for most legislative activity.82 Campaign money is of little value if
it cannot be turned into an electoral victorys and it makes little sense
to betray one's personal convictions, lose the support of one's party,
and offend public opinion in order to obtain a contribution. Other
factors that undoubtedly affect a legislator's actions might include an-
ticipated newspaper endorsements or the slant of reporting, including
deciding what qualifies as "news"; the opinions of staffers and per-
sonal friends and family; perceptions of whether or not a stand on an
issue could be distorted by an opponent into an effective campaign
attack; potential endorsements by interest groups; and (I suspect) a
host of other factors.8?
81 See, e.g., Hearings on Campaign Contribution Limits Before the Senate Comm. on Rules
and Administration, 106th Cong. (Mar. 24, 1999), available in 1999 WL 8086675, at *6
[hereinafter Hearings on Campaign Contribution Limits] (statement of former Senator
Dan Coates) ("Never, not once.., have I witnessed or been informed of the exchange
of dollars for political favors. Not by me or my supporters, not for any amount of
money, and not by anyone I have known or served with."). Senator Coates spent 18
years in Congress, in addition to four more as a congressional aide. See id. at *1.
82 See STEPHANIE MoUssAu, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: THE CASE FOR
DEREGULATION 6 (1990) (reporting that studies show that ideology, party, politics, and
constituency factors have a stronger influence than campaign contributions); FRANK
SORAUF, MONEYINAMERiCAN ELECTONS 316 (1988) ("[T)he evidence simply does not
support the more extravagant claims about the 'buying' of the Congress."); Larry
Sabato, Real and Imagined Corruption in American Campaign Financing, in ELECTIONs
AMERCAN STin 155, 160 (A. James Reichley ed., 1987) (noting that "most congress-
men are not unduly influenced by PAC money on most votes").
"s See Bruce Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 111, 116 (1995) (arguing that campaign contributions are merely a means to
the goal of getting elected and that votes are more crucial than money).
'4 On a personal level, for many years I have been associated with a variety of pub-
lic policy think tanks, and I currently sit on the Board of Trustees of one such institu-
tion. Never have I known any of these groups to take a position, or to avoid taking a
position, in order to please or to avoid offending donors. To the contrary, I have fre-
quently seen them take stands that incur the wrath of donors and cause major declines
in donations. In my role as a trustee, the only time I have seen the questions of donors
even come up is when discussing either how to inform the donor of the position the
organization intends to take, or when discussing how to convince the donor that he or
she should continue to contribute to the organization. I believe that this is how most
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Consider just what it would mean for a legislator to act in a "cor-
rupt" manner. For centuries, philosophers, political scientists, and
others have debated how a legislator ought to make decisions. Suffice
it to say that there is no consensus on the issue. Let me suggest, then,
a few ways of decision making which, I think, have enough legitimacy
that even those who disagree with them would not suggest that they
are "corrupt."
First, a U.S. congressperson or senator might choose to act ac-
cording to the desires of a majority of his constituents, whether or not
doing so comports with his own best judgment.8s Second, he might
choose to act according to his own best judgment and ideological
principles, whether or not doing so comports with the wishes of his
constituents. s This would be a legitimate method of acting whether
the legislator is measuring the benefits according simply to what is
best for his constituents, or whether he is considering what is best for
the nation as a whole. These do not exhaust the possibilities for le-
gitimate legislative action. A legislator might also legitimately (i.e.,
non-"corruptly") act in a way opposed to both her own best judgment
and opposed to the desires of a majority of her own constituency. For
example, if the legislator thinks it would be a good idea to allow pri-
vate discrimination against homosexuals in the rental housing market,
and recognizes that a majority of her constituents hold a mild prefer-
ence for allowing such private discrimination against homosexuals,
she might still act in support of a law barring such discrimination be-
cause of the much more intense preference of a minority of constitu-
ents who favor such legislation. This, too, I think is a legitimate mode
of legislative action.
Which theory is best is, of course, a question for another day. At
this point it is enough to note that a vote cast along any of these three
lines cannot really be called "illegitimate" or "corrupt." In practice, I
of the professors who write on "reform," and most of the staffers and board members
of advocacy groups which champion more regulation, conduct their affairs as well. It
strikes me as odd, if not offensive, that these people assume that most members of
Congress are feckless suits, easily swayed by a few dollars to their campaign organiza-
tions, while they themselves are men and women of principle. Nor have I felt that this
created a difficult conflict of interest problem.
8 SeeJohn Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government in THmE EssAys
143, 323 (Oxford ed. 1975) (noting that some representatives "feel bound in con-
science to let their conduct, on questions on which their constituents have a decided
opinion, be the expression of that opinion rather than of their own").
6 SeeEdmund Burke, TheEnglish ConstitutionalSystem, in REPRESENTATION 157, 175
(Hanna Fenichel Pitkin ed., 1969) (stating that although the opinion of constituents is
"weighty and respectable," the notion that a representative is "bound blindly" to obey
is "unknown" to the law").
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suspect that most legislators are frequently torn between these theo-
ries, and will usually vote their bestjudgment unless it means probable
electoral defeat, or, conversely, will usually vote with the constituency
unless the legislators hold very strong opinions to the contrary.
In any case, to find "corruption," we must assume that the repre-
sentative is acting against his own best judgment and principles,
against the wishes of a majority of his constituents, and against the in-
tense preferences of a minority of his constituents, and that he is do-
ing so in order to gain a campaign contribution (as opposed to a me-
dia or other endorsement, favorable press coverage, or some other
electoral advantage). How likely is any legislator to do such a thing
for a mere contribution? Yet people express surprise that empirical
studies fail to show monetary contributions exerting much influence.
This is not to say that money never plays a role, or that monetary
contributions may not weigh on the representative's mind.87 And, in-
deed, this simple observation defines a more subtle corruption thesis
advanced by Professor Lowenstein. Professor Lowenstein argues that
the fact that donor wishes will be just one factor among many in a leg-
islator's decision-making process is the problem, and is what makes
the role of money so insidious. It is not necessary for money to "cor-
rupt" legislators in any outright way. Rather, the mere fact that it is
there, influencing the "chemistry" or "mix" of the legislator's actions,
"taints" the legislative process.8 For Professor Lowenstein, this inabil-
ity to pinpoint the corruption is the clinching argument for doing
away with private financing. The system cannot be policed because
none of us-not even the legislators-can know the exact influence of
contributors.
But if the wishes of contributors are just one factor among many,
why do they "taint" the process any more than the fact that the legisla-
tor might consider the opinions of family, friends, or staffers; en-
dorsements by newspapers, colleagues, and key constitutents; the in-
formation provided by lobbyists or groups which have not made
contributions; and any of the other factors that might come into play?
One answer (apparently not Lowenstein's) is that money is "com-
pletely unrelated to the value of the idea it propels," whereas other in-
fluences "attract the candidate's attention because they are in a posi-
87 See Ortiz, supra note 60, at 899 ("[C]andidates [might] become so beholden to
contributors that they follow the contributors' rather than the voters' interests. Every-
one, including the Supreme Court, agrees that this is a serious danger. The pivotal
questions concern how great a danger it actually presents .... ").
93 Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 325-26.
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tion to persuade voters or to deliver blocks of votes."" But this is not
really the case. The spouse's position in the bedroom and ability to
gain a legislator's ear may also be "unrelated to the value of the idea it
propels." Staffers and friends are not in positions to "persuade voters
or deliver blocks of votes" any more than most contributors. Newspa-
per and other endorsements are typically decided by a small group of
individuals, who then try to persuade voters of the candidate's merit,
and are in that respect little different than contributions, which are
given to the candidate by a voter or voters so that the candidate can
directly try to persuade other voters of the candidate's merit. Clearly
the problem is not that money is any more "tainting" than are many of
the other factors that go into decision making, and that, in any event,
are secondary to the dominant, "untainted" considerations of ideology
and constituency desires.
Professor Lowenstein's answer, and apparently Professor Brif-
fault's, is that this low-level monetary influence is inappropriate simply
because our culture regards it as inappropriate.9 The potential influ-
ence of money is a problem because, among forms of political influ-
ence, we consider money a unique problem. He argues that scholars
such as myself "would not be at such great pains to characterize the
influence of campaign contributions as minimal if they did not believe
that it would be wrong if the contributions were influential, or at least
that the overwhelming majority of their fellow citizens believe that it
would be wrong."9' I disagree. We are at pains to show that the influ-
ence of contributions is minimal-in the sense that they might lead to
the quid pro quo corruption that Buckey held to be the constitutional
justification for limits and that most citizens find abhorrent-precisely
because if we show that contributions do not lead to rampant quid pro
quo corruption, we believe that the majority of our fellow citizens will
not be concerned about campaign contributions or find them prob-
lematical. And the placidity with which citizens react to reform pro-
posals, so-called scandals, and proposals for government financing is
evidence of that fact.! The fact is, the American people have proven
89 Rosenkranz, supra note 69, at 894-95.
'0 See Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 328-29 (describing campaign contributions as
"payments of money to the official for the official's benefit" and concluding that this is
the "paradigm case for improper influence").
"' Id. at 329.
92 See Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activities in Connection with the 1996 Federal
Election Campaign-Part VIIH Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
105th Cong. 400 (1997) (statement of Curtis Gans, policy analyst) [hereinafter Investi-
gation of 1996Elections] (discussing public disinterest in campaign finance "scandals,"
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time and time again that they are not particularly disturbed by the way
in which campaign funds are raised and the minor role that they
might play in legislative behavior.
Professor Lowenstein then adds that our culture regards any role
for private money as inappropriate because "it constitutes bribery, as
that crime is defined in most American jurisdictions."93 I doubt, how-
ever, that any state enacted its bribery statute with campaign contribu-
tions in mind. In any case, as Professor Lowenstein notes, campaign
contributions are rarely prosecuted under such laws. He attributes
this to the pervasiveness of the practice, rather than to approval of the
process.94 I attribute it to the fact that no more than a very small mi-
nority of Americans really consider private contributions to be brib-
ery, and that there is no more a cultural norm against the practice
than there is a cultural norm against driving 68 miles per hour in a 65
mile per hour zone.
Thus, I cannot agree with Professor Lowenstein's assertion that:
It is a fact of our political culture that although a great variety of the
pressures brought to bear on politicians embody forces that are regarded
as more or less democratic and therefore legitimate, this is not true of
pressure imposed by payments of money to politicians, either for their
personal benefit or for campaign use.95
To the contrary, I believe that our political culture does not con-
sider a contribution for campaign use to be corrupting, which is why
campaign finance reform has never become an important issue with
the voting public, and which is why millions of American citizens
make campaign contributions and never feel the least tainted by the
process. Indeed, my own observation is that politicians often find it
easier to tell a constituent that his vote was dictated by campaign con-
tributions than to admit that it was dictated by disagreement with the
and concluding "the American people understand that it takes money to run political
campaigns and that, in the absence of total public financing of such campaigns, candi-
dates are going to, and should, solicit funds for those campaigns"); Smith, supra note
24, at 833-36 (noting that public opinion polls reveal the public's ambivalence on the
issue of campaign finance reform); The Tarrance Group, Key Findings from a Nationwide
Survey of Voter Attitudes About Campaign Finance Reform (visited Oct. 18, 1999)
<http://www.tarrance.com/polls/campfin.htm> (finding that 78% of respondents op-
pose tax funding of campaigns).
93 Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 329. See generally Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political
Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Poliics, 32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 808-09, 826-28 (1985)
(opining that most campaign contributions constitute bribes).
SeeLowenstein, supra note 18, at 329.
95 Id.
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constituent. That strongly suggests that there is not a strong cultural
norm against the influence of contributors, even when that influence
is described in terms that indicate "corruption" far more strongly than
Professor Lowenstein's idea of a "tainted" system.
It is probably true that it is rare for a legislator to admit that con-
tributors influenced his activity, but it is, I believe, equally rare for a
legislator to admit that the possibility of a newspaper endorsement, or
even the endorsement of a powerful group representing large num-
bers of members, influenced his activity.96 So the opinions of donors
go into the mix, along with the opinions of numerous other individu-
als whose influence sometimes does and sometimes does not have any-
thing to do with their numbers, their talents, or some third party's
view of the merit of their opinions.
Most Americans are sophisticated enough to recognize that these
donors usually represent large numbers of persons with similar views,
and when they do not, it is perhaps even more important that they be
heard. Indeed, in some cases it will be a good thing for the represen-
tative to overtly consider donations, as monetary contributions can be
an indicator of the intense preferences of a minority, or of the prefer-
ences of the majority. Given all this, I am simply not persuaded that
this influence-and this type of influence alone-is so corrupting that
it calls for limiting a primary mechanism, and in many cases the only
real mechanism, for millions of Americans to participate in the politi-
cal system.
At this point we are told that even if all that I have written is true,
the political system is "corrupt" because some have more "access" than
others. This is not entirely true. The fact is, the vast majority of cam-
paign contributors never seek access, and legislators meet regularly
with people who have never made contributions. Nor does every con-
tributor who seeks access get it.97 To the extent that the access theory
is true, however, I am not exactly certain why this should shock me.
For one thing, such contributors are often well informed on public
issues and provide valuable information to representatives. But be-
yond that, I think we are back to the romantic notions of political life
that surface in the equality debates. There seems to be a notion that
96 How often do you hear a Democrat say that he thinks minimum wage increases
are a bad idea, but votes for them anyway just to keep labor unions happy? Or even
that the prospect of getting labor's vote influenced his decision?
9 See Hearings on Campaign Contribution Limits, supra note 81, at *6 (testimony of
former Senator Dan Coates) ("A contribution is by no means necessary to obtain a
meeting, and a meeting by no means guarantees results.").
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but for monetary contributions, the typical congressional representa-
tive would... well, would what? Randomly call citizens in his district
to get their opinions?98 Or spend more time golfing? The most likely
result, I think, is that the typical representative would spend more
time with the people who already surround him most of the day, and
who make up the single largest group of witnesses in congressional
committee hearings: other government employees and officials. Per-
sonally, I would rather see him or her get out and spend some time
with private sector lobbyists." But if private contributions were
banned, there are two things of which we can be absolutely sure: the
overwhelming majority of citizens would still never, ever, get to spend
even two minutes discussing public affairs with their congressional
representatives; and the number of private citizens with whom that
representative does discuss public affairs would almost certainly de-
cline.
IV. THE FUTILIY OF GOVERNMENT FINANCING
So, are we left at a draw? Either you subscribe to the Platonist
theory of political equality or you do not; either you find the anti-
corruption rationale (which by definition cannot be disproven) per-
suasive, or you do not. Despite the disadvantages to government fi-
nancing pointed out in Part I, 1 suspect that most people who fall into
the former categories-that is, who accept Platonist thinking or who
still fear corruption, however improbable-will still favor government
financing.
There is, however, one more issue to address, and having written
so much prose, it seems almost perverse to disclose it now. Neverthe-
less, here it is: even with a major change in constitutional jurispru-
dence (probably requiring a constitutional amendment), government
financing will not solve either the equality or the corruption prob-
lems.
We have 100% government financing, with voluntary spending
limits, of the presidential general election campaigns now. No major
party nominee has ever opted out of the system or broken the expen-
Imagine the probable results of such phone calls. I expect that there would be a
large number of hang-ups, many more "I don't knows," and a great deal of off-the-cuff
advice by persons with little knowledge of the issues the representative may be address-
ing. In general, it would be time poorly spent.
Others might not, but I see no reason why they should impose their theory of
good government on my representative!
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diture limit'0 Yet, those who demand more regulation, in this case
those who favor extending some type of tax financing to congressional
and senatorial campaigns, do not generally consider the presidential
system to have even remotely resolved the problems of equality or cor-
ruption. The reason is simple: the primary result of public funding of
presidential campaigns has been to distort political campaigns and
cause monetary participation to take new forms. In particular, the
successful effort to chop off the head of "evil" in presidential cam-
paigns-private donations to candidates-has caused the Hydra-like
growth of the twin "evils" of "soft" money and "issue advocacy," which
would-be regulators now denounce."' Thus, candidates' campaigns
do not spend money, yet money is spent, on independent expendi-
tures, issue ads, convention sponsorship, party-building activities fi-
nanced with soft money, and more. "Soft" money and "issue advo-
cacy," to focus only on the two most disparaged evils, cannot be
successfully regulated for both practical and constitutional reasons. °2
Even if proposals to regulate "soft" money and "issue advocacy"
0 Candidates, including George W. Bush and Steve Forbes, have opted out of the
primary system, but no major party nominee has opted out of public funding in the
general election.
'0' For a description of "soft" money and its evils from the perspective of an avid
partisan for banning soft money, see Donald J. Simon, Beyond Post-Watergate Reform:
Putting an End to the Soft Money System, 24J. LEGIs. 167, 177 (1998). For a recent discus-
sion of issue ads, again from a pro-regulation standpoint, see Richard Briffault, Issue
Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (1999).
10 The Supreme Court's key decisions on the right to engage in "issue advocacy"
are Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79-80 (1976) (restricting permissible regulation to
funds spent in concert with a candidate to advocate election or defeat of a clearly iden-
tified candidate), and Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc, 479
U.S. 238, 253-54 (1986) (distinguishing Massachusetts Citizens for Life from PACs be-
cause its purpose is issue advocacy rather than the nomination or election of a candi-
date). Recent efforts to regulate "issue advocacy" within the constraints ofBudey have
been uniformly struck down by the courts. SeeJames Bopp, Jr., Campaign Finance "Re-
form'" The Good, the Bad, and the Unconstitutional, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER
(Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.), July 19, 1999, at 1 (citing 20 federal cases
that have "adhered faithfully to the 'explicit' or 'express' words of the advocacy test
according to its plain terms"). The Court has never explicitly ruled on efforts to ban
soft money but has implicitly indicated that most soft money cannot be regulated in
accordance with the Constitution. See Bopp, supra, at 7 (noting that the Court has
found that proposed bans on political parties' receiving soft money cannot be justified
by the government's interest in preventing corruption); Gora, supra note 73, at 161
(noting that there is "not a word in Buckley" that suggests that the Court would uphold
a total ban on PACs and soft money); Smith, supra note 54, at 182-83 (noting that the
Buckey court suggested that ads which did not urge the election or defeat of a candi-
date could not be constitutionally subjected to regulation); see also Issacharoff & Kar-
Ian, supra note 19, at 1708-17, 1735-36 (discussing both practical reasons and general
constitutional principles that make regulation unlikely to succeed).
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were to be upheld against constitutional challenge in the courts--or
perhaps implemented after constitutional amendment---this would
not solve the regulators' dilemma. There are simply too many ways
for those who want to influence public policy to do so. For example,
in 1996 the Republican and Democratic parties spent nearly $41 mil-
lion on their national conventions, although only $8 million was pro-
vided in federal funds for the conventions. The extra money came in
the form of corporate sponsorship for "civic and commercial" pur-
poses.10 In fact, such sponsorship both helps the conventions work as
part of the campaign (by firing up activists and drawing added paid
and free media attention) and provides a method for donors inter-
ested in supporting candidates and parties to do so.
Convention sponsorship is an obvious way of rerouting political
spending in a world of spending caps. Even if soft money and issue
ads could be constitutionally regulated, many other approaches would
spring up, perhaps including the purchase of partisan media outlets.
Thus, extreme proposals now favor curbing the ability of the press to
make political endorsements." 5 Even these proposals, if enacted un-
der an amended constitution (almost certainly a necessity), would not
solve the "problem" because the main complaint with the influence of
the press is not over its overt editorializing but rather over its coverage
and selection of news.1 6 There are numerous other ways to sidestep
even these draconian types of regulation. With a federal government
that currently spends over $1.5 trillion per year and which claims the
right to regulate local education, virtually every phase of the em-
ployer-employee relation, prices, wages, gun ownership, birth control,
tobacco use, drug use, foreign trade, health care, and much, much
more, there is no reason to think that those who seek to influence
who holds power in this monumental government will not be creative
enough to circumvent the regulations."'
103 Such a resolution was introduced and voted on in the 105th Congress. See
H.R.J. Res. 47, 105th Cong. (1997).
'04 SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF
TBE POLrrIcAL PROCESS 660-61 (1998).
105 See Foley, supra note 66, at 1252 (advocating a rule which would "prohibit news-
papers from using their resources to publish editorials that support or oppose a candi-
date or ballot initiative"); Hasen, supra note 58, at 1665 ("[P]olitical equality will be
limited so long as the media are exempt from otherwise applicable campaign finance
regulations.").
'06 See L.A. Powe, Jr., Boiling Blood, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (1999) ("The influ-
ence of the press comes from its choices of coverage: which stories (or issues) and how
presented (including photography).").
107 See Bradley A. Smith, The Sirens' Song Campaign Finance Regulation and the First
TAXPAYER-FUNDED POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS
Of course, a system that makes participation harder, and perhaps
less effective, may eventually reduce or eliminate such participation.
After all, if issue ads had to be run at least sixty days before an elec-
tion-a currently popular proposal-they may not be as effective, re-
sulting in a decline in their use. One who is convinced that federal
representatives are easily bought and purchased, or one who favors
the Platonist concept of political equality, may find this a worthwhile
endeavor.
I think, rather, that our experience with campaign finance laws
indicates that any number of things could go wrong with this manner
of reform. Making such political activity less effective may just in-
crease the amount of it in order to achieve the same results. It may
lead to the creation of other advertising means that can affect federal
elections-indeed, wherever the line on express advocacy is drawn, it
will not be hard for political operators to stand at the edge of the new
line. Restrictions on private financing may increase the influence of
groups with a strong, permanent presence in Washington, rather than
increasing the influence of more decentralized groups that rely on a
large membership base and a PAC funded by small contributions.
Such restrictions might also inhibit the arrival of a well-financed hero
to channel their energies, much as large contributions to the Gene
McCarthy campaign in 1968 brought together disparate, scattered
anti-war sentiments into a meaningful, anti-Vietnam War political
campaign. This is particularly true if, as with the McCarthy campaign,
key issues come to the fore too late for a would-be candidate to com-
ply with the government financing scheme. Restrictions may simply
drive expenditures further underground.
In short, where the editors' proposition goes most wrong is when
it says, "including voluntary spending limits."""3 The only real "volun-
tary" spending limit comes when those who care about politics decide
not to spend any more-everything else is a coercive limit on political
speech, else it need not be included in the law. Because the limit is
not voluntary, and because we have a First Amendment allowing free
discussion of political issues, a way will be found around that limit. So
long as this is the case, the goal of "reduc[ing] the political influence
of special interests,"1°9 whether we define that influence as creating an
Amendment, 6J.L. & POL'Y 1, 28-41 (1997) (noting that there will always be loopholes
and that the potential for corruption will always exist)." Elecion 2000: Point / Counterpoint Series, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 561 (1999).
109 Id.
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"equality" problem or a "corruption" problem, is not going to be met
merely through government financing.
CONCLUSION
Government subsidies of political campaigns, if not tied to bans
on private contributions and spending limits, may indeed have certain
benefits for political life." ° A well-designed system might increase
competitiveness, and therefore accountability, and it might also in-
crease the flow of information to voters as well as the availability of
well-qualified candidates. For reasons discussed in Part I, I tend to be
skeptical that such a well-designed system could be enacted or main-
tained."' In any case, such a system is probably off the charts politi-
cally: none of the major "reform" groups seems willing to even con-
sider a government funding proposal that does not include limits on
contributions and spending.'"
2
Government financing plans which include limits on contribu-
tions and spending, whether deemed "voluntary" or not, are doomed
to failure. The United States was well served by the totally deregulated
system that existed prior to this century and by the largely deregulated
system that existed prior to the passage of FECA in 1974. Even with
the distortive effects that FECA has had on the political scene, the
United States remains one of the healthiest democracies, despite, or
perhaps because of, its reliance on private financing of campaigns.
Rather than rethink our historic opposition to government-
financed campaigns, perhaps it is time for self-styled reformers to re-
think their opposition to deregulated campaigns.
110 See Gora, supra note 73, at 184-86 (arguing that meaningful public subsidies and
funding of candidates and campaigns will facilitate political opportunity and participa-
tion).
' It is beyond the scope of this Article, but I share many of the concerns of those
who argue that tax financing of political speech is at its core morally wrong. See Tho-
mas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in THE PORTABLE THOMAS
JEFFERSON 252 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975) ("[To compel a man to furnish contri-
butions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is
sinful and tyrannical .... "). I also share the concerns of many who consider it bad
policy to have politicians more beholden to the government for their campaign fund-
ing than to their fellow citizens.
2 The only significant group of which I am aware that has consistently urged such
an approach is the American Civil Liberties Union. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, POLICYGUIDE 75-77 (1993).
